Obsessive–Compulsive Disorder and Memory-Mixing in Temporal Comparison: Is Implicit Learning the Missing Link? by Gu, Bon-Mi & Kukreja, Keshav
INTEGRATIVE NEUROSCIENCE
Obsessive–compulsive disorder and memory-mixing in 
temporal comparison: is implicit learning the missing link?
Bon-Mi Gu1* and Keshav Kukreja2
1  Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, NC, USA
2  Department of Neuroscience, Rhodes College, Memphis, TN, USA
*Correspondence: bg43@duke.edu
Humans cope with uncertainty in their 
daily lives in a variety of ways. At one end 
of the spectrum would be individuals diag-
nosed with obsessive–compulsive disorder 
(OCD). OCD patients have difficulty tol-
erating even the slightest amount of uncer-
tainty if it is related to their symptoms (see 
Gentes and Ruscio, 2011 for review). For 
example, a patient may wash his hands 
continuously for an hour to avoid germs, 
check the door repeatedly to ensure that 
it is locked safely, or hoard everything for 
the slight chance that they might need 
it later. In contrast, healthy individu-
als are able to ignore these uncertainties 
because they exploit their prior experi-
ences, providing themselves with a sense 
of security. Acknowledging the reasons 
for their anxiety as trivial does not nec-
essarily attenuate obsessive thoughts, and 
deficits in implicit processes dealing with 
uncertainty could be a potential reason for 
their sustained obsession. Dysfunctions in 
implicit learning have been reported in 
patients with OCD (Deckersbach et al., 
2002; Kathmann et al., 2005), suggesting a 
possible role of implicit contextual knowl-
edge in reducing the anxiety underlying 
obsessive behaviors.
The application of implicit knowledge 
could be useful in terms of optimizing 
behavioral performance in many cases, but 
it can also bias our behavior in unfavora-
ble ways. For example, if a seasoned squash 
player were learning to play tennis for the 
first time, he would perform better than a 
novice due to the level of similarity between 
these two sports with regard to fine hand 
and wrist coordination. However, because 
he is accustomed to the shorter squash 
racquet, it would be difficult for him to 
adjust to the noticeably longer tennis rac-
quet. Therefore, although this implicit 
knowledge would most likely increase the 
player’s precision in performance by reduc-
ing the variability of hand movements, it 
would sacrifice accuracy due to the inher-
ent   differences between the racquet sizes 
and the required motor actions of grip bal-
ance and strength.
It was recently demonstrated that a 
Bayesian model, which optimizes reasoning 
through the trade-off between accuracy and 
precision, could simulate the biased perfor-
mance of participants in situations where 
they are instructed to reproduce specific 
stimulus durations (Jazayeri and Shadlen, 
2010; Mamassian and Landy, 2010). 
Participants tend to bias their reproduc-
tions toward the mean of the distribution; 
specifically, they overestimate “short” dura-
tions and underestimate “long” durations. 
This phenomenon was first referred to as 
Vierordt’s law (Woodrow, 1951; Lejeune 
and Wearden, 2009; Mamassian and Landy, 
2010) and, more recently, has been described 
as a form of “memory-mixing,” which rep-
resents the distortions in temporal memory 
caused by the encoding of multiple signal 
durations into a single memory distribution 
(Penney et al., 1998, 2000; Klapproth, 2009; 
Grondin, 2010; Gu and Meck, 2011).
The reasons for the existence of 
“ memory-mixing” remain largely unknown, 
although instructional ambiguity has 
been proposed as a possible explanation 
(Klapproth, 2009) and factors dealing with 
the scalar property of temporal memory 
may also be involved (Gibbon et al., 1984). 
Another plausible explanation is that the 
implicit knowledge of the underlying stim-
ulus distribution generates behaviors that 
are less variable, but still biased. Devoting 
less attention to the encoding of the imme-
diate stimulus could result in the reliance on 
prior context through automatic process-
ing, thus generating a form of “memory-
mixing.” If “memory-mixing” is in fact 
generated by implicit knowledge of prior 
contexts and reliance on automatic process-
ing, we could then hypothesize that patients 
with OCD, who are known to have deficits 
in implicit learning (Deckersbach et al., 
2002; Kathmann et al., 2005), will display 
a lesser degree of “memory-mixing” on a 
temporal reproduction/comparison task in 
comparison to healthy participants.
Furthermore, there is evidence showing 
that patients with OCD could compensate 
for their deficiency in implicit learning with 
hippocampal-dependent explicit knowl-
edge (Rauch et al., 2007). A combination 
of normal explicit learning and a deficit 
in implicit learning would suggest that 
an OCD patient’s perception of the cur-
rent trial’s signal duration would be less 
influenced by the context of prior signal 
durations. Therefore, it is highly probable 
that they compensate for their inability to 
exploit implicit knowledge of the context 
(e.g., trial sequence and mixture of different 
signal durations) with increased vigilance 
to the present signal duration that they are 
asked to encode. This will eventually reduce 
the degree of uncertainty as well as the effect 
of “memory-mixing.”
Nevertheless, we cannot discount the 
possibility that the “memory-mixing” could 
be caused by other factors. Instead of the 
implicit knowledge of the entire distribu-
tion of prior signal durations, the residual of 
the immediately preceding duration could 
be the main source of “memory-mixing.” 
The effects of the most recent trial have 
been shown to significantly influence the 
subsequent trial (Gu and Meck, 2011), 
implicating a process whereby temporally 
close events have a greater effect on the cur-
rent trial. If this is the case, then the strength 
of the residual components of the previous 
trial will determine the resulting degree of 
“memory-mixing.”
Cognitive inflexibility in OCD patients 
has been observed through deficits in 
task-switching and reversal learning 
(Chamberlain et al., 2008; Gu et al., 2008). 
These effects imply that the mental rigidity 
of OCD patients causes them to maintain 
their previous memory sets, which creates 
difficulty in rapidly updating memory 
with new information. Therefore, patients 
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from previous trials during their perfor-
mance on the subsequent trial, result-
ing in an increase of “memory-mixing.” 
Furthermore, it is expected that the atten-
tion of OCD patients would be especially 
captured by information encoded during 
the previous trial if it is related to feed-
back and/or has an emotional valence 
(see  Droit-Volet and Meck, 2007; Gu 
et al., 2011). For example, if a neutral and 
OC-related emotional stimulus are pre-
sented in combination with 1.0 and 0.6 s 
durations, respectively, it is likely that the 
reproduction of the durations associated 
with the neutral stimulus preceded by 
the shorter emotional stimulus would be 
underestimated.
In conclusion: We have hypothesized 
two scenarios whereby “memory-mixing” 
would be expected to occur within a tem-
poral reproduction/comparison task for 
patients with OCD who are thought to 
have altered dopaminergic activity in the 
cortico-striatal circuits involved in timing 
and time perception (Buhusi and Meck, 
2005; Meck et al., 2008; Allman and Meck, 
2011; Gu et al., 2011). It is possible that 
OCD patients would exhibit more “mem-
ory-mixing” than control participants due 
to the strong residuals from the previous 
trial. However, it would be more plausible 
that they exhibit a lesser degree of “mem-
ory-mixing” due to their inability to exploit 
implicit knowledge while simultaneously 
displaying increased vigilance toward the 
signal presented on the current trial. This 
would be especially likely if a sufficiently 
long inter-trial interval is presented with-
out the intervention of any emotional 
stimuli. The potential significance of this 
hypothesis lies within its ability to aid in our 
understanding of how normal individuals 
and OCD patients deal with uncertainty in 
their environment. We  necessarily choose a 
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balance between  utilizing our  accumulated 
implicit knowledge and increasing our 
vigilance to systematic changes in the 
environment (Buhusi and Meck, 2009; Gu 
et al., 2011).
RefeRences
Allman, M. J., and Meck, W. H. (2011). Pathophysiological 
distortions in time perception and timed perfor-
mance. Brain (in press).
Buhusi, C. V., and Meck, W. H. (2005). What makes us 
tick? Functional and neural mechanisms of interval 
timing. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 6, 755–765.
Buhusi, C. V., and Meck, W. H. (2009). Relative time shar-
ing: new findings and an extension of the resource 
allocation model of temporal processing. Philos. 
Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B. Biol. Sci. 364, 1875–1885.
Chamberlain, S. R., Menzies, L., Hampshire, A., 
Suckling, J., Fineberg, N. A., del Campo, N., Aitken, 
M., Craig, K., Owen, A. M., Bullmore, E. T., Robbins, 
T. W., and Sahakian, B. J. (2008). Orbitofrontal 
dysfunction in patients with obsessive-compulsive 
disorder and their unaffected relatives. Science 321, 
421–422.
Deckersbach, T., Savage, C. R., Curran, T., Bohne, A., 
Wilhelm, S., Baer, L., Jenike, M. A., and Rauch, S. L. 
(2002). A study of parallel implicit and explicit infor-
mation processing in patients with obsessive-com-
pulsive disorder. Am. J. Psychiatry 159, 1780–1782.
Droit-Volet, S., and Meck, W. H. (2007). How emotions 
colour our perception of time. Trends Cogn. Sci. 
(Regul. Ed.) 11, 504–513.
Gentes, E. L., and Ruscio, A. M. (2011). A meta-analysis 
of the relation of intolerance of uncertainty to symp-
toms of generalized anxiety disorder, major depres-
sive disorder, and obsessive-compulsive disorder. Clin. 
Psychol. Rev. 31, 923–933.
Gibbon, J., Church, R. M., and Meck, W. H. (1984). Scalar 
timing in memory. Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci. 423, 52–77.
Grondin, S. (2010). Timing and time perception: a review of 
recent behavioral and neuroscience findings and theo-
retical directions. Atten. Percept. Psychophys 72, 561–582.
Gu, B. M., and Meck, W. H. (2011). “New perspectives on 
Vierordt’s law: memory-mixing in ordinal temporal 
comparison tasks,” in Time and Time Perception 2010, 
LNAI 6789, eds A. Vatakis, A. Esposito, F. Cummins, G. 
Papadelis, and M. Giagkou (Berlin: Springer-Verlag), 
67–78.
Gu, B. M., Park, J. Y., Kang, D. H., Lee, S. J., Yoo, S. Y., Jo, 
H. J., Choi, C. H., Lee, J. M., and Kwon, J. S. (2008). 
Neural correlates of cognitive inflexibility during 
task-switching in obsessive-compulsive disorder. 
Brain 131, 155–164.
Gu and Kukreja  Memory-mixing in OCD
Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  August 2011  | Volume 5  |  Article 38  |  2